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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - NEGLIGENCE: NORTH
DAKOTA MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
IS LIMITED IN SCOPE
In 1980, Berger Electric, Inc., planned, constructed and
installed an electrical heating system in the home of Wayne and
Diane Jilek.1 Approximately five years later, the Jileks discovered
that the heating system had caused substantial damage to their
home.' The Jileks commenced suit on June 27, 1986, against Ber-
ger Electric, claiming that Berger Electric violated the terms of its
contract and breached the implied warranty of fitness for the pur-
pose intended by failing to plan and install an adequate heating
system:3 Berger Electric moved for summary judgment, asserting
that the Jileks' claim was essentially a professional malpractice
claim and was, therefore, barred by the two-year professional mal-
practice statute of limitations.4 The trial court granted summary
judgment, reasoning that because Berger Electric's employee was
licensed by the state as a master electrician, he was therefore a
professional entitled to the protection of the two-year professional
malpractice statute of limitations.' The Jileks appealed from the
1. Jilek v. Berger Elec., Inc., 441 N.W.2d 660, 661 (N.D. 1989). Berger Electric
inserted "heat strips," an innovative new heating system, which was installed above the
sheetrock ceilings to transfer heat into the rooms. Appellant's Brief at 2, Jilek v. Berger
Elec., Inc., 441 N.W.2d 660 (N.D. 1989) (No. 340CV86).
2. filek, 441 N.W.2d at 661. The heating strips operated at temperatures which were
too high for the sheetrock to withstand. Appellant's Brief at 2-3, Jilek v. Berger Elec., Inc.,
441 N.W.2d 660 (N.D. 1989) (No. 340CV86). The extremely high temperatures eventually
deteriorated the sheetrock, and the Jileks were forced to replace most of their ceiling. Id.
3. filek, 441 N.W.2d at 660-61. The Jileks also submitted a claim for mental anguish
and suffering. Id.
4. Id. at 661. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(3) (Supp. 1989) (professional
malpractice actions must generally be commenced within two years after the claim for
relief has accrued). Berger Electric had previously moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that claims for negligent breach of contract are not recognized under North
Dakota law, that the contract claim was barred by a four-year statute of limitations, and that
no basis for relief existed concerning the claim for mental anguish. Jilek, 441 N.W.2d at
661. Upon hearing argument, the trial court had granted summary judgment on the
mental anguish claim. Id. However, the court had denied the motion for summary
judgment regarding the breach of contract and negligence claims. Id.
5. Id. The trial court found that the duty of care for a master electrician was the same
as the standard for an attorney or physician. Jilek v. Berger Elec., Inc., No. 340CV86 slip
op. at 4 (Stark County Dist. Ct. Nov. 1, 1988) (order granting summary judgment). The trial
court therefore found that the two-year malpractice statute of limitations applied to master
electricians. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(3) (Supp. 1989) (professional malpractice
statute of limitations). Section 28-01-18(3) of the North Dakota Century Code provides in
relevant part:
The following actions must be commenced within two years after the claim
for relief has accrued:
3. An action for the recovery of damages resulting from malpractice;
provided, however, that the limitation of an action against a physician or
licensed hospital will not be extended beyond six years of the act or omission
of alleged malpractice by a nondiscovery thereof unless discovery was
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summary judgment, contending that their claim was not barred by
the two-year professional malpractice statute of limitations
because that statute does not apply to electricians.6 The North
Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the
Jileks' claim was not barred by the two-year professional malprac-
tice statute of limitations because electricians are not professionals
for purposes of the professional malpractice statute of limitations.7
Jilek v. Berger Elec., Inc. 441 N.W.2d 660 (N.D. 1989).
At common law, there was generally no specified period of
time within which a claimant was required to bring suit.8 How-
ever, courts did invoke a presumption that if the aggrieved party
failed to file suit in a timely manner, the dispute has been settled
or discharged by the parties themselves.9 Thus, in order to have a
stale claim heard before a court, the aggrieved was required to
provide good reason why the suit had not been brought with
greater expediency.' ° In an attempt to balance the need for fair-
ness to aggrieved parties with the need for judicial efficiency,
courts frequently barred cases which had not been timely filed."
Because the courts' justifications for barring stale claims
resulted in a lack of uniformity, legislative intervention was
needed to enact uniform statutes-of limitation.' 2 Considerations in
enacting statutes of limitation revolve around issues of "fair-
prevented by the fraudulent conduct of the physician or licensed hospital.
This limitation is subject to the provisions of section 28-01-25.
Id.
6. Jilek, 441 N.W.2d at 661. On appeal, the Jileks argued that the appropriate statute
of limitations was the six-year statute of limitations for nonprofessional negligence. Id. See
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-16 (Supp. 1989) (general statute of limitations for contractual and
negligence claims).
7. filek, 441 N.W.2d at 663. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that
electricians are tradespersons, not professionals. Id. The court concluded that the two-year
malpractice statute of limitations applies only to persons practicing professions. Id. See
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(3) (Supp. 1985) (for the text of section 28-01-18(3) of the North
Dakota Century Code, see supra note 5). The court stated that because electricians
practice a trade, the two-year malpractice statute of limitations does not apply to
electricians. Id. Instead, the court stated, the six-year statute of limitations for
nonprofessional negligence applies to electricians and other tradespersons. Id. See N.D.
CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(3) (Supp. 1985) (for the full text of § 28-01-18(3), see supra note 5).
8. 51 AM. Jur. 2D Limitation of Actions § 1 (1970).
9. See id. (common time limitation actually imposed by the courts was the duration of
the aggrieved party's life).
10. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 7 (1970).
11. Annotation, Limitations - Accountant's Negligence, 26 A.L.R. 3d 1438, 1440
(1970). Professional negligence is governed by dual policy considerations. Id. Balance
must be made between subjecting the professionals to stale lawsuits and protecting patients
and clients from losing their respective rights by undiscoverable means. Id.
12. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 9 (1970). Statutory enactments for shorter
limitations periods are usually linked to particular actions or situations. Id. at § 11. For
example, executors and administrators of estates are protected by a shorter statutory period
to more expediently ascertain claims against the deceased. Id.
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ness."' 13 Fairness requires that an aggrieved party have a reason-
able time to bring a claim. 4 Claims which, by their nature, are
discovered longer after the injury has occurred require longer
statutes of limitation than those claims which are realized almost
immediately.' 5 However, fairness also requires that disputes be
litigated while physical evidence is still available and testimonial
evidence is still somewhat reliable.16
The North Dakota legislature has enacted a statute of limita-
tions for malpractice actions.' 7 Section 28-01-18(3) of the North
Dakota Century Code provides that malpractice actions must be
brought within two years after the claim for relief has accrued.',
Although the malpractice statute makes specific references to phy-
sicians and licensed hospitals, the legislature did not specify who
might be subject to malpractice actions. 9
North Dakota has previously expanded the concept of "mal-
practice" beyond physicians for purposes of the professional mal-
practice statute of limitations.20 In Johnson v. Haugland,2' the
North Dakota Supreme Court had the opportunity to decide
whether the malpractice statute of limitations applied to attor-
neys. 2 The court first decided that the action in question must be
professional in nature to be governed by the malpractice statute of
limitations. 3 The court found that the term "malpractice" meant
the failure of a person to perform professional services with the
degree of skill and learning commonly applied by another reputa-
ble professional member of the community in the same or similar
circumstances, resulting in loss or damage.24  The court then
13. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 17 (1970). The primary purpose of a statute
of limitations is to require litigation within a reasonable time so that the defendant has an
adequate opportunity to defend the suit. Id.
14. Id. Reasonable times vary with the reasonableness of the injured party
ascertaining the injury, taking into consideration the difficulty of discovery of the cause of
action. Id.
15. See id. at § 31-36.
16. Id. at § 17. Limitation of actions are to insure repose and to require bringing suit
before the evidence has deteriorated to the point of unusefulness. Id. (citifig Burnett ;v.
New York Central R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965)).
17. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(3) (Supp. 1989).
18. Id.
19. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(3) (Supp. 1989) (no definition for "malpractice"
appears in the statute, although physicians and licensed hospitals are mentioned by name).
20. See Johnson v. Haugland, 303 N.W.2d 533, 539 (N.D. 1981) (holding that lawyers
were professionals within the meaning of the professional malpractice statute of
limitations).
21. 303 N.W.2d 533 (N.D. 1981).
22. Johnson v. Haugland, 303 N.W.2d 533, 536 (N.D. 1981).
23. Id. at 538. The court noted that the allegations were in the specific context of the
attorney/client relationship. Id. Such action was professional in nature, resulting from a
duty to exercise professional skill and judgment. Id.
24. Id. (citing Websters Third New Int. Dictionary (unabr. 1971)).
1990]
312 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:309
decided that the actual nature of the action, rather than the form
of the remedy, is the appropriate inquiry in determining whether
an act constitutes malpractice.25 Therefore, whether the claim is
made on a contractual basis or a tortuous basis is of no conse-
quence if the nature of the claim is breach of a professional duty.2 6
The court stated that a breach of professional duty results in appli-
cation of the two-year statute of limitations, accruing at the time
the injurious act could reasonably be discovered. The appellant's
claim against the attorneys was found to be professional in nature
and, therefore, was barred by the two-year malpractice statute of
limitations.28
Examining claims against "professionals" other than doctors
and lawyers, the North Dakota Supreme Court decided in Heimer
v. Privratsky29 that optometrists were "professionals" under the
scope of another statute, but had no occasion to decide whether
optometrists were professionals within the meaning of the mal-
practice statute of limitations.30 In Heimer, the court noted that
optometrists and medical doctors must meet similar educational
25. Id, The court rejected the appellant's common law contention that where a
conflict arises between statutes of limitation, the longer should apply. Id.
26. Id. See Lisenby, Statute of Limitations For Suits Against Attorneys: Contract or
Tort?, J. LEGAL PROF. 205, 206 (1985) (the New York Supreme Court has encountered great
difficulty in deciding whether contract or tort policies control the statute of limitations for
attorney malpractice).
27. Johnson v. Haugland, 303 N.W.2d 533, 539 n.5 (N.D. 1981). The court in Johnson
noted that no legislative history accurately predicted the interpretation of the malpractice
statute of limitations. Id. It was further noted that the 1975 amendment to the malpractice
statute of limitations gave new insight to the intentions of the legislature. Id. The
amendment specifically gave the medical profession an extra protection via a maximum
discovery time rule. Id. The court found that this explicit exception inferred that the
legislature envisioned that more than just the medical profession would be covered by the
statute and, therefore, needed to expressly single out the medical profession to be
specifically addressed. Id. The 1893 statute had allowed only for a two year statute of
limitations for an action for the recovery of damages resulting from malpractice. Id. The
1975 amendment expanded the concept to:
An action for the recovery of damages resulting from malpractice, provided,
however, that the limitation of an action against a physician or licensed hospital
will not be extended beyond six years of the act or omission of alleged
malpractice by a nondiscovery thereof unless discovery was prevented by the
fraudulent conduct of the physician or licensed hospital.
Actions having two-year limitations, Ch. 284 1975 N.D. LAws 841.
28. Johnson, 303 N.W.2d at 539.
29. 434 N.W.2d 357 (N.D. 1989).
30. See Heimer v. Privratsky, 434 N.W.2d 357, 360 (N.D. 1989) (the court noted that
optometrists were professionals, because of the strict legal and educational prerequisites
mandated by law in order for them to practice). The real question involved in Heimer was
whether expert testimony should be allowed. Id. at 359. Cf Three Atffliated Tribes v.
Wold Eng'g, 419 N.W.2d 920, 922 (N.D. 1988) (North Dakota Supreme Court decided this
case on lack of proximate cause, and therefore did not consider the trial court's
determination that engineers were professionals within the meaning of the malpractice
statute of limitations).
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requirements to practice. 31 The court noted that optometrists
must also pass strict licensing and testing requirements. 32 Con-
cluding that the standard of care applicable to medical doctors was
identical to that applicable to optometrists, the court found that
the requirement that claimants against medical doctors procure
expert witnesses should apply to claimants against optometrists as
well.33
The North Dakota Supreme Court further examined the
scope of the malpractice statute of limitations in filek v. Berger
Electric, Inc.34 Infilek, the defendant, Berger Electric, moved for
summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs' action was
barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to profes-
sional malpractice. 35 The trial court granted summary judgment
to Berger Electric, reasoning that the statute of limitations for pro-
fessional malpractice should apply to master electricians.36 The
North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, holding that master elec-
tricians practice a trade and, therefore, are not professionals for
purposes of the two-year professional malpractice statute of
limitations.37
The North Dakota Supreme Court began its analysis by recog-
nizing that three methods have been used by other courts to
determine what occupations may be considered professions for
31. Heimer, 434 N.W.2d at 360.
32. Id. The legal prerequisites for practicing optometrists are outlined in Chapter 43-
13 of the North Dakota Century Code. N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 43-13 (Supp. 1989).
33. Heimer, 434 N.W.2d at 360. The court found that the underlying purpose of the
statute requiring expert witnesses in medical malpractice claims was to prevent frivolous
litigation. Id. at 359. This legislative purpose was found to be just as applicable to claims of
optometrical malpractice claims as it was to medical malpractice claims. Id.
34. 441 N.W.2d 660, 661 (N.D. 1989).
35. Jilek v. Berger Elec., Inc., 441 N.W.2d 660, 662 (N.D. 1989). Berger Electric
contended that electricians should be considered professionals because there are three
classes of electricians licensed in North Dakota. Id. at 662. The highest ranking electrician,
known as a Class A Master Electrician, is a person with the qualification, training,
experience, and technical knowledge to plan, lay out, and supervise the installation and
repair of electrical wiring apparatus and equipment for electric light, heat, and power. Id.
at 662, n.2 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-09-01 (Supp. 1989)).
36. Jilek, 441 N.W.2d at 661. The trial court relied heavily on Section 299A of the
Second Restatement of Torts. Id. at 663. Section 299A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts provides in relevant part:
It applies to any person who undertakes to render services to another in the
practice of a profession, such as that of physician or surgeon, dentist, pharmacist,
oculist, attorney, accountant or engineer. It applies also to any person who
undertakes to render services to others in the practice of a skilled trade, such as
that of an airplane pilot, precision machinist, electrician, carpenter, blacksmith
or plumber. This section states the minimum skill and knowledge which the
actor undertakes to exercise, and therefore to have.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965). The trial court reasoned that because
the standard of care was identical for tradespersons and professionals, the applicable statute
of limitations should be as well. Jilek, 441 N.W.2d at 663.
37. Id. at 663.
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purposes of malpractice statutes of limitations .3  The North
Dakota Supreme Court declined to adopt the method of limiting
the definition of "professionals" to those professions recognized at
common law: medicine, law, and theology.39 The court noted
that there are occupations other than those recognized at common
law which fall within the ordinary meaning of "profession," such
as optometrists. 40 The court stated that the common law profes-
sions were a reasonable starting point, but declined to limit the
definition of profession to the degree espoused by common law.41
The North Dakota Supreme Court also declined to adopt the
method of including all occupations licensed by the state within
the definition of professions.42 The court stated that including all
licensed occupations within the definition of professions would
encompass a vast group of occupations beyond those the legisla-
ture intended, thus contradicting the limited scope of "profes-
sions."4 3  The court noted that if all licensed occupations were
considered professions, vocations such as cosmetology, embalming,
and plumbing would potentially be considered professions for pur-
poses of the professional malpractice statute of limitations.44
38. Id. at 662. See Head, Florida's Professional Malpractice Statute of Limitation: To
Whom Does it Apply?, 1975 FLA. B. J. 63, 64 (discussing problems raised by the absence of a
statutory definition of malpractice).
39. Jilek, 441 N.W.2d at 662. See United States v. Laws, 163 U.S. 258, 266 (1895) (even
in 1895, the Supreme Court recognized that as knowledge and training became
increasingly important, the number of occupations considered professional might be
greatly expanded). See also Dennis v. Robbins Funeral Home, 411 N.W.2d 156, 157-58
(Mich. 1987) (court refused to include morticians within the professional malpractice statute
of limitations; court could not find any legislative intent to include morticians and therefore
adopted the narrower common law approach); Hocking Conservancy Dist. v. Dodson-
Lindblom, 404 N.E.2d 164, 166 (Ohio 1980) (court denied extending the professional
malpractice statute of limitations to nurses; court found that nurses did not exercise enough
independent judgment to qualify as professionals and, therefore, limited its view of the
extension of the malpractice statute only to those professions recognized at common law).
40. Jilek, 441 N.W.2d at 662. The court noted that they had previously recognized
optometrists as professionals in Heimer v. Privratsky, 434 N.W.2d 357 (N.D. 1989). Jilek,
441 N.W.2d at 662. For a full discussion of Heimer v. Privratsky, see supra notes 29-33 and
accompanying text.
41. lilek, 441 N.W.2d at 662.
42. See also Owyhee County v. Rife, 593 P.2d 995, 1000 (Idaho 1979). (The Idaho
Supreme Court foundthat a licensure was a minimum requirement for professionals and
denied extension of the professional malpractice statute of limitations to non-certified
public accountants.)
43. Jilek, 441 N.W.2d at 662. The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that in Johnson
v. Haugland, the court declined to limit the term "professional" to only those occupations
recognized at common law. Id. See Johnson v. Haugland, 303 N.W.2d 533 (N.D. 1981)
(holding that lawyers are subject to the two-year malpractice statute of limitations). For a
discussion of Johnson v. Haugland, see supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
44. Jilek, 441 N.W.2d at 662. The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that such a
broad interpretation would encompass all those occupations licensed under chapter 43 of
the North Dakota Century Code, thus being much more expansive than the court believed
the legislature intended. Id. See generally N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 43-01 to 43-40 (Supp.
1989) (listing all of the licensed trades and professions in North Dakota and briefly
describing the rules governing each of them).
314
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The court adopted the third method which expounded on the
dictionary definition of "profession. ' 45  This method focuses on
specialized knowledge, intensive preparation of skills, and the
scholarly principles underlying preparation of those skills. 46 The
court noted that the Johnson decision was primarily based on the
dictionary definition of "malpractice" and again looked to that
source for guidance. 4' The court recognized that there was a dis-
tinction between a "trade" and a "profession"; while a profession
encompasses primarily mental processes, a trade encompasses pri-
marily physical processes.48 The court found that a profession
required a minimum of a college degree in a specific field.4' Fol-
lowing the lead of the Florida Supreme Court, the North Dakota
Supreme Court held that a college degree prerequisite is the
intrinsic characteristic of a "professional. 5 ° Therefore, the court
found that because an electrician is not required to obtain a col-
lege degree, an electrician is a tradesperson rather than a profes-
sional.51 The court also noted that the Restatement (Second) of
Torts recognizes a distinction between trades and professions, and
that comment b of the Restatement lists electricians as an example
of one who practices a trade.52 Thus, the court disagreed with the
trial court's finding that because the standard of care was similar
between professions and trades, the statute of limitations should
be the same as well.53 Therefore, the court concluded that a trade
is not included within the protection of the malpractice statute of
limitations.5 4 Electricians, being tradespersons; were subject to
the six-year statute of limitations applicable to general claims
45. Jilek, 441 N.W.2d at 662.
46. See Tylle v. Zoucha, 412 N.W.2d 438, 440-41 (Neb. 1987) (court found a profession
to be a vocation requiring specialized knowledge, long and intensive preparation,
instruction in skills and methods, organizational minimum conduct standards, and
continuing education).
47. Jilek, 441 N.W.2d at 661. See Johnson v. Haugland, 303 N.W.2d 533 (N.D. 1981)
(relying on the dictionary to define malpractice). For a full discussion of Johnson v.
Haugland, see supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
48. Jilek, 441 N.W.2d at 662-63.
49. Jilek, 441 N.W.2d at 663.
50. See also Pierce v. AALL Ins. Inc., 531 So.2d 84, 86-87 (Fla. 1988) (professions are
denoted by a four-year degree in a specific field and ethical considerations are governed by
an organized body of professional colleagues). The court in Pierce refused to accept the
premise that insurance agents were professionals within the meaning of the professional
malpractice statute of limitations. Id.
51. Jilek, 441 N.W.2d at 663.
52. Id. For the full text of the Restatement, see supra note 36. The North Dakota
Supreme Court looked at the passage from the point of view of distinction of occupational
classifications, rather than the trial court's view of similarity in duty of care. Id.
53. Id. The trial court reasoned that because the electricians are subject to the same
standard of care as doctors and lawyers, it would be absurd not to allow them use of the
same statute of limitations. Id.
54. filek, 441 N.W.2d at 663.
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based on negligence or on contract theories.55
The decision inJilek sheds some light on the definition of pro-
fessional malpractice, but leaves the door open for most educated,
restrictive-entry occupations to make a sound argument for inclu-
sion within the malpractice statute of limitations.5 6 The court's
definition certainly seems to ratify inclusion of what several
authorities have deemed the five most often included "profes-
sions" for malpractice statute purposes: attorneys, architects,
accountants, engineers, and physicians.5 7 These professions
clearly require a college degree in a specific field of specialized
training.58 The problem arises when a court facing a malpractice
claim is confronted with those occupations which involve licenses,
college degrees, and specialized training, but are not commonly
viewed as classic "professions. ' 59 Absent any legislative clarifica-
tion, courts will be faced with the question of who might be sub-
ject to the two-year statute of limitations for years to come, despite
the guidance the Jilek court offers.6 °
Randall S. Hanson
55. Id. The court noted the Restatement's separation of trade and profession in
concluding that only those occupations which were considered professionals (and not
tradesman) should be given the protection of the professional malpractice statute of
limitations. Id.
56. id.
57. Landry, A Prescription to Fill: Limitations on Accounting and Legal Malpractice
in Louisiana, 30 Loy. L. REV. 101, 101 n.1 (1984).
58. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 43-01 to 43-40 (Supp. 1989) (lawyers must have a
college degree and pass a standardized test).
59. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-10 (Supp. 1989) (embalmers must be licensed and
specifically trained, yet are not generally thought of as professionals).
60. See, e.g., Wall v. Lewis, 366 N.W.2d 471, 473 (1985) (perhaps complications may
erupt concerning newly included professions in deciding "time of discovery" or extensions
in time allotted for discovery when caused by fraudulent acts of the professional).
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